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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
Case No. 910500 
Category 3 
RONNIE LEE GARDNER, 
Petitioner-Appellee 
and Cross-Appellant, 
v. 
TAMARA HOLDEN, Warden 
of the Utah State Prison, 
State of Utah, 
Respondent-Appellant 
and Cross-Appellee. 
REPLY BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT 
Petitioner-Appellee and Cross-Appellant Ronnie Lee Gardner 
submits the following arguments and authorities, in addition to 
those contained in his Opening Brief: 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT RULED CORRECTLY IN DETERMINING THAT MR. 
GARDNER'S CLAIMS WERE NOT PROCEDURALLY BARRED AND IN DECIDING 
TO REACH THEIR MERITS. 
In the court below, the State argued that the district court 
should not consider the issues raised by Mr. Gardner because they 
were or could have been raised in his direct appeal. After 
briefing and argument, the district court granted summary judgment 
on claims that had been included in the appeal. The court ruled 
that other issues were appropriately before it for resolution, and 
decided them on their merits. 
In its Notice of Appeal and Docketing Statement, the State did 
not assign error to the district court's ruling on the procedural 
issues. Now, however, the State argues in its "Introduction to 
Brief of Cross-Appellee" that this Court should reject these claims 
as procedurally barred because they were not raised by former 
counsel in Mr. Gardner's direct appeal. Legally and factually, the 
State's argument lacks support. 
Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure establishes 
procedural rules for postconviction and habeas corpus proceedings. 
Rule 65B must be construed "against the constitutional background 
of the use of the Writ [of habeas corpus]." Hurst v. Cook, 777 
P.2d 1029, 1033 (Utah 1989). Rule 65B(i) incorporates the Uniform 
Postconviction Procedure Act, which was intended to "liberalize 
state habeas corpus proceedings and make them 'flexible enough so 
that with sympathetic consideration of pleadings and methods of 
presenting issues, a prisoner will always be able to raise his 
claim in a state court." 777 P.2d at 1034. 
As a general matter, postconviction review should not 
substitute for appellate review, and issues that could have been 
included in an appeal may not be raised in a habeas corpus or 
postconviction proceeding except in unusual circumstances. 
Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983). Justice Stewart 
wrote separately in Codianna to emphasize that there were "numerous 
Utah cases which have addressed the merits of habeas claims even 
though the issues raised were known or should have been known to 
petitioner and his counsel at the time of conviction and could have 
been raised on appeal." 660 P.2d at 1114 (Stewart, J., 
concurring). 
In Hurst, the majority adopted Justice Stewart's reasoning and 
held that "The general policy favoring the finality of judgments 
cannot, therefore, always prevail against an attack by a writ of 
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habeas corpus. As important as finality is# it does not have a 
higher value than constitutional guarantees of liberty." 777 P.2d 
at 1035. The Court accordingly recognized that the failure to 
raise a claim on appeal is not determinative.1 
Here, the district court correctly concluded that Mr. Gardner 
received ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. The facts 
supporting this conclusion establish that exceptional circumstances 
exist to excuse the failure to raise the claims here earlier. The 
district court made the following findings of fact: 
Mr. Ed Brass was appointed to replace the Salt Lake Legal 
Defenders Association based on petitioner's claim he 
received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and 
on direct appeal. Mr. Brass filed a supplemental brief 
arguing that there was no evidentiary record to frame the 
issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. In addition, 
it is not contested that Mr. Brass was appointed by the 
Supreme Court's order, a copy of which order he claims 
not to have received, to file a supplemental brief to 
address matters not previously addressed. Consequently, 
based on telephone conversation with Chief Justice Hall, 
he understood he was appointed only to address the issue 
of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Mr. Brass 
claims to not have received a copy of its opinion. 
A further problem exists. 
The Supreme Court's order discharging the Salt Lake Legal 
Defenders Association was not scrupulously honored. 
Attorney Joan Watt testified she was instructed in an 
informal telephone call from the Supreme court,s clerk to 
file the appropriate documents in Mr. Gardner's behalf 
after the decision affirming his conviction and sentence 
was announced. Although the Supreme Court had decided 
that he was entitled to independent counsel on the 
1
 In Hurst, the Court addressed the second petition filed 
by the petitioner. The State argued that his second application 
was procedurally barred because the issues should have been 
included in the first petition. The petition here is Mr. Gardner's 
first, rather than a successor petition, and the principles of 
Hurst apply with even greater force. See also, Gerrish v. Barnes, 
844 P.2d 315 (Utah 1992). 
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ineffective assistance issue, Ms. Watt also prepared the 
Supplemental Petition for Rehearing and Supplemental 
Reply to State's Response to Appellant's Petition for 
Rehearing, which were signed and filed by Mr. Brass. 
(Memorandum Decision, at 28) . These findings are supported by the 
record, and the trial court properly decided to determine Mr. 
Gardner's claims on their merits. 
In addition, the State also urges this Court to find 
procedural default on the hypnosis claim, although it did not seek 
summary judgment on this basis below. In addition to the general 
grounds for rejecting a procedural default defense to Mr. Gardner's 
petition, there are specific reasons for refusing to apply it to 
the hypnosis claim. The State has waived a procedural default 
defense by failing to seek dismissal on this basis below, and has 
deprived Mr. Gardner and the trial court of their respective 
ability to make argument or enter findings of fact on the issue. 
This Court should address the hypnosis claim on its merits. 
II. MR. GARDNER RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT 
TRIAL AND SENTENCING, ON THE GROUNDS ARGUED BELOW IN ADDITION 
TO THE SIXTH AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS FOUND BY THE DISTRICT 
COURT.2 
A. Conflict of Interest 
According to the State, the advocate-witness rule does not 
establish a conflict of interest in Mr. Gardner7s representation by 
Andrew Valdez and James Valdez because the two lawyers were not 
necessary witnesses. However, their observations at the scene did 
not relate to issues which were "incidental or insignificant," but 
Argument III in Mr. Gardner7s Opening Brief. 
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instead went to the heart of the defense counsel attempted to 
present. 
The State implies that counsel here were not necessary 
witnesses under this Court7s decision in Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa 
& Son, 808 P.2d 1061 (1991). In Watkiss & Campbell, a legal 
billing dispute, the Court addressed the admissibility of an 
affidavit submitted by counsel for the defendant as to his opinion 
that the plaintiff's bill was unreasonable. In fact, the Court 
noted "that [the plaintiff] should have objected to [defense 
counsel's] continuing representation and that he should have been 
disqualified." 808 P.2d at 1066 (emphasis added). 
The evidence from counsel in Watkiss & Campbell addressed an 
essential part of the defense there — whether or not the fee was 
reasonable. Similarly, trial counsel's potential testimony here 
also went to a crucial issue — the effects of Mr. Gardner's chest 
wound. As in Watkiss & Campbe11, representation by counsel who 
were witnesses was not appropriate. 
The State also relies upon State v. Hoyt, 806 P.2d 204 (Utah 
App. 1991). In Hoyt, the appellant argued that trial counsel had 
a conflict of interest because she had applied for a job in the 
prosecutor's office. However, the court of appeals rejected the 
"implication ... that counsel might have been inclined to 'throw' 
the trial so as to curry favor with the prosecution." 806 P.2d at 
212, n.8. According to the court, the appellant had not cited 
anything in the record "which might suggest a demonstrable conflict 
of interest." 806 P.2d at 212. 
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Here, however, the conflict of Mr. Gardner's trial counsel is 
not a matter of speculation or implication. Rather, it is 
supported by the record and arises from the fact that they could 
have testified in his defense. 
The necessity and relevance of counsel's testimony is 
demonstrated by the fact that trial counsel sought to present 
evidence from a witness who had seen him "shortly after he'd been 
shot." (H. 134). Brad Snow testified about his observations of 
Mr. Gardner on the courthouse lawn. (T. 2475, 2477). This 
testimony addressed the issues about which counsel could have been 
witnesses, but was much weaker than their testimony would have 
been. The prosecution challenged this testimony based on the 
distance between the witness and Mr. Gardner at the scene. In 
contrast, counsel's own contact with Mr. Gardner was much closer — 
they talked to him, and heard his pleas to be taken to the 
hospital. 
In addition, the prosecution elicited evidence from police 
officers at the scene, suggesting that Mr. Gardner was calm and 
composed.3 Counsel's testimony could have countered this evidence. 
Further, if they had not represented Mr. Gardner, James Valdez 
would not have tainted the trial by attempting to testify through 
the back door in cross-examination questions to a prosecution 
3
 It is interesting to note that the State continues to 
rely on testimony from its witnesses that on the courthouse lawn 
Mr. Gardner "had a blank facial expression, seemed calm and gave no 
indication of pain (Tr. 2315-17, 2332). He smiled a couple of 
times (Tr. 2071, 2333)." (Brief of Appellant and Cross-Appellee, 
at 6) . 
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witness. See T. 2340; United States v. Iorizzo, 786 F.2d 52, 57 
(2nd Cir. 1986). 
Trial counsel had an actual conflict of interest which 
precluded their effective representation of Mr. Gardner. Yet, the 
postconviction court ruled that "though there may be some evidence 
of a conflict and as a result, some deficiency in representation, 
because of the weight of the direct evidence of petitionees guilt, 
there is no prejudice beyond a reasonable doubt." As explained 
earlier, Mr. Gardner was not required to demonstrate prejudice 
under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). (Opening 
Brief of Petitioner-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, at 31). Rather, 
prejudice is presumed if an actual conflict of interest had any 
adverse effect on counsel's representation. The legal standard 
applied by the court below was erroneous and should be corrected. 
B. Inadequate Representation 
The State asks this Court to assume that when the district 
court wrote that trial counsel's deficient actions were not 
prejudicial beyond a reasonable doubt, the court actually meant 
that any errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court 
should reject this invitation. 
The "harmless beyond reasonable doubt" standard is used to 
determine whether constitutional errors are harmless, and is based 
on Chapman v. Californiaf 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Neither Mr. Gardner 
or the State cited Chapman in the district court on the issue of 
ineffective assistance. In fact, the Chapman standard is not 
appropriate in assessing ineffective assistance claims; the 
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prejudice standard from Strickland v. Washington must be applied. 
Further, the postconviction court clearly applied the Chapman 
standard on other issues, where it did control, and used explicit 
language to do so. With its complicated attempt to suggest that 
the district court did not mean what it said, the State urges this 
Court to ignore the written words which demonstrate that an 
erroneous legal standard was applied below. If the district 
courts decision to grant relief on the basis that counsel were 
ineffective in investigating and failing to obtain and present 
mitigating evidence, this Court should reverse the determination 
that Mr. Gardner did not establish prejudice on other ineffective 
assistance issues. 
Because of their deficient performance, recognized in part by 
the district court, trial counsel did not effectively challenge the 
State7s aggravating evidence and did not effectively present a 
cohesive and understandable theory of mitigation. In addition, 
counsel's omissions in the guilt phase,4 prevented the presentation 
of an adequate defense and resulted in the introduction of 
inadmissible, prejudicial evidence against Mr. Gardner. 
4
 See Opening Brief of Petitioner-Appellee and Cross-
Appellant, at 38-43. Further, Mr. Gardner does not abandon his 
claim that counsel were ineffective in failing to insure that a 
complete record, including attorney-client disagreements and 
requests that counsel withdraw. This failure exacerbated and 
obscured the difficulties that Mr. Gardner had with counsel, their 
resulting conflict and deficient performance, and the 
constitutionally detrimental effect on his trial. 
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III. MR. GARDNERS CONVICTION MUST BE VACATED BECAUSE IT WAS BASED 
ON HYPNOTICALLY ENHANCED TESTIMONY.5 
The State contends that Robert Maori's hypnotically enhanced 
testimony at Mr. Gardner's trial was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt, because it "was not critical to the State's case." 
According to the State, testimony from another person in the 
clerk's office, Ed Seamons, diminished the importance of Mr. 
Macri's evidence. However, Mr. Seamons was some distance away when 
the door closed and the shot was fired, and his testimony was 
contradictory. (T. 2158-59, 2193, 2203, 2218-19, 2228). 
The State also claims that testimony bearing on whether Mr. 
Gardner was startled into firing the gun is irrelevant because of 
"strong" evidence of his intent to kill. The State claims that the 
intent to kill Mr. Burdell can be inferred from the facts that Mr. 
Gardner planned an escape attempt, that he later shot a uniformed 
bailiff and that he forced a bystander to accompany him as he 
attempted to leave the building. (Brief of Appellant and Cross-
Appellee, at 31) . These actions do not shed light on Mr. Gardner's 
intent when he fired the shot. 
Clearly, evidence that Mr. Gardner fired the gun in reaction 
to a startling event was important to the defense that he did not 
intend to kill Mr. Burdell. Evidence explaining how the shooting 
occurred also was relevant to the sentencing determination, because 
the change in Mr. Macri's testimony affected its potential 
mitigating effect. 
Argument IV in Mr. Gardner's Opening Brief. 
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IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING AN INSTRUCTION THAT WOULD 
HAVE INFORMED JURORS THAT THE PROSECUTION HAD TO ESTABLISH THE 
EXISTENCE OF AN AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT.6 
The State concedes that the need for a finding on the 
existence of an aggravating circumstance is implied by the decision 
in State v, Woods, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 988 
(1982) . However, the State contends that the denial of the 
instruction requested here was not error because "No Utah case ... 
has ever required that the jury be separately instructed that they 
may only consider aggravation which they find to exist beyond a 
reasonable doubt." (Brief of Appellant and Cross-Appellee, at 41) . 
The State also argues that the federal constitution does not 
require the prosecution to establish the existence of an 
aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. 
What rule required by the federal constitution is irrelevant 
here — the Woods standard is not dictated by the Eighth Amendment, 
and other states have been satisfied with a less rigorous scheme, 
including some which place the burden of proof on the defendant to 
show that mitigation outweighs aggravation. In Utah, the need for 
the reasonable doubt standard is derived from Woods and its 
progeny, as a matter of state law. 
As for the argument that no error occurred because the 
instruction requested by the defense had never been commanded 
before in a published decision, the State's argument appears to be 
circular. Trial courts also have the duty to interpret and apply 
Argument IX in Mr. Gardner's Opening Brief. 
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the law and may not simply depend upon appellate courts to 
pronounce the rule on every issue that arises in the course of 
proceedings. The instruction Mr. Gardner sought was logically 
compelled by the Woods opinion; he was not required to wait until 
some other case had explicitly announced that it was mandated. 
Thus, the lack of a previous appellate opinion on this precise 
issue is no answer. The State does not argue the merits of Mr. 
Gardner's contention that the instruction should have been given. 
This Court should make explicit the rule that the existence of 
aggravating circumstances must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and should hold that the refusal to give the requested instruction 
here requires a new sentencing hearing. 
V. MR. GARDNER'S RIGHTS TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, 
TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND TO A FAIR HEARING HAVE BEEN VIOLATED 
BY THE DISTRICT COURTS REFUSAL TO APPOINT AN INVESTIGATOR AND 
EXPERT WITNESSES TO ASSIST MR. GARDNER; THE REFUSAL TO PROVIDE 
THIS ASSISTANCE IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINT ON MR. 
GARDNERS ABILITY TO PRESENT HIS CASE.7 
As it did below, the State disagrees with the district court's 
conclusion Mr. Gardner adequately established the prejudice prong 
of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland 
v. Washingtonf 466 U.S. 668 (1984). This argument is based on the 
State's assertion that "There is no evidence that petitioner 
actually has organic brain syndrome." (Reply Brief of Appellant, 
at 11). 
If this Court agrees with the State, any failure to present 
evidence of Mr. Gardner's organic brain damage was the result of 
7
 Argument X in Mr. Gardner's Opening Brief. 
11 
the court's refusal to provide expert assistance in the 
postconviction proceeding. The dilemma faced by Mr. Gardner is 
highlighted by the State's assertion in its brief that "The weight 
of the evidence in the trial record indicates that petitioner does 
not have organic brian syndrome." (Reply Brief of Appellant, at 
11) . It is clear from Dr. Heinbecker's testimony at trial and at 
the postconviction hearing that adequate testing was not done to 
evaluate organic brain damage, which was suggested by several 
factors in Mr. Gardner's history.8 Yet Mr. Gardner cannot now 
obtain the necessary tests because of the State's refusal to 
provide expert assistance, and the failure to get them done when 
help was available resulted only from trial counsel's deficient 
performance. 
Organic brain deficits are identified through specialized 
tests which must be performed by medical and psychological experts. 
It is fundamentally unfair to refuse to pay for evaluations by 
these experts, and at the same time to urge that the lack of 
evidence means that prejudice has not been established. Under the 
State's theory, postconviction relief could never be ordered for an 
indigent petitioner on the basis of ineffective assistance where 
8
 According to Dr. Heinbecker's testimony at trial, these 
factors were a bout with meningitis, a history of sniffing gasoline 
and glue beginning at age 9, and a suggestion based on a Bender-
Gestalt test conducted in 1972 Utah State Hospital that brain 
damage was present. (T. 1577-78). In the testimony cited for the 
State's assertion that Mr. Gardner does not have organic brain 
syndrome, Dr. Heinbecker explained that statements in earlier 
reports had not been supported by appropriate testing, or any 
testing at all in some cases. 
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expert testimony is necessary to explain the prejudice caused by 
counsel's inadequate performance. 
The State argues that expert and investigative assistance was 
not required by Utah statutes because the action below was civil 
rather than criminal, and because it was discretionary. The State 
relies upon United States Supreme Court cases ruling that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel does not extend to state postconviction 
proceedings.9 
The right to funding for experts and investigators in 
postconviction should not depend on whether the proceeding is 
labeled "civil" or "criminal." Despite this label, the nature of 
a postconviction proceeding is essentially "criminal" in 
character.10 A postconviction petitioner seeks relief from a 
criminal conviction and sentence, and the case requires the 
application of substantive criminal law to claims that the original 
criminal process was not conducted fairly. 
9
 In a leading case cited by the State, Murray v. 
Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989), the Court's opinion was joined by 
four justices. Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion which 
indicated that his agreement with the result was limited to the 
"facts and record of this case." His opinion also emphasized that 
"collateral relief proceedings are a central part of the review 
process for prisoners sentenced to death," and that solutions to 
the problem of death row access to the courts were being considered 
by Congress and state legislatures. 
In addition, it is worth noting that a 5-4 decision in 
the United States Supreme Court is susceptible to being reversed. 
See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S.Ct. 2597 (1992) (reversing South 
Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), and Booth v. Maryland, 
482 U.S. 496 (1987). 
10
 Some states, whose procedures do not differ markedly from 
Utah's, classify a postconviction petition as a "criminal" matter. 
E.g., Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32, Colo. R. Crim. P. 35(c). 
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In any event, the State does not contend that Mr, Gardner does 
not have the rights to due process, equal protection and access to 
the courts because his conviction has been affirmed on direct 
appeal. As the Supreme Court has held: 
The right of access to the courts ... is founded in the 
due process clause and assures that no person will be 
denied the opportunity to present to the judiciary 
allegations concerning violations of fundamental 
constitutional rights. 
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974). ££•_, Long v. Iowa. 
385 U.S. 192 (1966) (Equal protection right to state-funded 
preparation of transcript in state postconviction proceedings); 
Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) (Equal protection right to 
file state postconviction action without payment of filing fee). 
It is fundamentally unfair to deny Mr. Gardner the ability to 
respond meaningfully to the State's arguments and to prove his case 
because he lacks the funds to pay for necessary expert and 
investigative assistance. To remedy the violations of Mr. 
Gardner's rights to due process of law, equal protection and access 
to the courts, this Court should uphold the conclusion that a new 
sentencing hearing and appeal are required. Alternatively, this 
matter should be remanded to the district court with orders to 
reopen the case and to provide experts and investigators to assist 
volunteer counsel in establishing that Mr. Gardner's conviction and 
sentence were obtained in violation of the constitution and laws of 
Utah and the United States. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons and authorities, in addition to 
those contained in his Opening Brief, Mr. Gardner is entitled to a 
new trial, sentencing hearing and appeal.11 
Respectfully submitted this 11th day of June, 1993. 
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li On the claims not specifically addressed in this Reply 
Brief, Mr. Gardner relies upon his opening Brief and does not waive 
or abandon them. 
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